HUMILITY AND CHILD AUTONOMY IN CHILD WELFARE AND CUSTODY

Representation of Children

By Ann M. Haralambie

Introduction
In the past twenty-five years, a critical mass of attorneys has made child representation their specialty or a significant part of their family law or child welfare practice. They have established a recognized subspecialty, with professional organizations, multidisciplinary training, and professional standards. There has long been confusion about the role of an attorney representing children in child welfare and private custody matters, particularly with respect to who determines the positions taken in the litigation. In the past decade, several organizations have sought to address this confusion by promulgating standards and recommendations for representing children, and there have been two invitational symposia to discuss and generate recommendations on representing children. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has recently promulgated a uniform act on representing children in child welfare and custody cases.

While there is consensus among commentators to move in the direction of child-directed representation, there is still resistance, especially among judges, to abandon the more familiar guardian ad litem role in which the attorney advocates the child’s best interests as determined by the attorney. But even in a substituted judgment model, there is now consensus that the attorney should be guided by objective criteria, not merely the attorney’s subjective views and experiences.

The well-intentioned "child savers" of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when they stayed in the field long enough to see beyond short-term outcomes, learned that what they thought were decisions made in the best interests of children did not always have the beneficial results they had intended. The more they learned about children’s attachments and priorities and actual outcomes, the more they realized just how much they did not know and how the unintended consequences of positions taken on behalf of children made their lives worse, not better. Neurobiology, medicine, and child psychology have provided greater information on the effects of child abuse and long-term outcomes. By the turn of the twenty-first century, a
consensus, born of humility, was reached within the legal community concerning child representation in child welfare and custody cases. It was realized that even specially trained attorneys are not equipped to determine what is in the child’s best interests. The profession has moved towards giving the child greater autonomy in directing legal representation to allow the child’s own position and perspective to be given real advocacy and allowing the judge, not the attorney, to evaluate all of the evidence in determining what is in the child’s best interests. However, in representing the child, attorneys have a greater understanding of their need for multidisciplinary collaboration in fulfilling their role as counselors, as well as advocates, for their child clients. This article discusses the recent standards and models of representation and recommends increasing the child’s autonomy in directing his or her own representation.

The Standards
In 1994, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers adopted Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys and Guardians ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings (AAML Standards). The AAML Standards take the basic position that children should not routinely be appointed attorneys in custody cases, but that when attorneys are appointed for “unimpaired” children, they should be client-directed. The AAML Standards recognize a “serious threat to the rule of law posed by the assignment of counsel for children [in] the introduction of an adult who is free to advocate his or her own preferred outcome in the name of the child’s best interests.” Therefore, if the child is deemed “impaired,” a status presumed for children under the age of twelve, the attorney should only present evidence to the court and explain the proceedings to the child, but should not advocate any position at all. The AAML Standards have been criticized for their artificial and impractical distinction between “impaired” and “unimpaired” children and for abandoning all advocacy for younger children and were explicitly rejected by two sets of American Bar Association (ABA) standards and two symposia.

The ABA Abuse and Neglect Standards describe a role similar to that of an adult’s attorney, advocating the client’s expressed position, but provide for advocacy of the child’s objectively determined legal interests for certain circumstances. In acquiescence to the reality that courts continue to appoint attorneys in a dual attorney/guardian ad litem role, the ABA Abuse and Neglect Standards strongly recommend abolishing such a role, but do provide some guidance for an attorney who must serve in that role.

Because of concerns that the ABA Abuse and Neglect Standards tipped the scale too far towards autonomy at the expense of beneficence, the National Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) wrote its own revised version of Standard B-4, which directs the attorney to assume a substituted judgment role based on objective criteria when the child cannot meaningfully participate. The revised version would also require the attorney to request appointment of a guardian ad litem, a discretionary act under the ABA Abuse and Neglect Standards, if the child’s wishes are seriously injurious to the child.

The ABA Custody Standards build on the Abuse and Neglect Standards, continue the client-directed model embodied in the Abuse and Neglect Standards, but also create the role of a “best interests attorney,” who is not bound by the child’s directives. Unlike the AAML Standards, the ABA Custody Standards envision a robust advocacy role for the best interests attorney, with the only (but very significant) difference between an attorney functioning in that role and one functioning in a client-directed role being that the best interests attorney may determine the position to be advocated, with the related ability to use, without disclosing, client confidences.

Determination of the position taken, however, is a matter of objective deter-
mination of the child’s legal interests. The ABA Custody Standards also require attorneys to establish and maintain a relationship with their child clients, whether acting as a child’s attorney or as a best interests attorney.

The Symposia
In 1995, Fordham University Law School convened the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, which culminated with the development of a set of recommendations. The Fordham Recommendations provided that the child’s expressed wishes are always part of a best-interests determination and that the “traditional” client-directed role of attorney for a child can, under some circumstances, include consideration of the child’s best interests. Further, the recommendations rejected the guardian ad litem role for children’s attorneys, whereby the attorney would become a quasi-witness.

In 2006, the William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada Las Vegas, convened a symposium entitled Representing Children in Families: Exploring the Relationship Between Children’s Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham (“Las Vegas Conference”). That conference, the most recent national consensus, endorsed all of the Fordham recommendations and also promulgated its own recommendations. Most pertinent to a discussion of the role of the child’s attorney is Recommendation IV.A, which identifies practicing guidelines for children’s attorneys.

The Working Group on the Best Interests of the Child and the Role of the Attorney “unanimously reaffirmed the Fordham commitment to client-directed representation,” stating that this is the preferred approach even in best interests representation. The group rejected a bright-line age rule for whether a child’s attorney should adopt a client-directed or best interests role and “reaffirmed that all children, regardless of age, were entitled to an attorney who zealously advocates for their expressed wishes.” In summary, the symposium articles argued that “children’s voices must be heard; children’s individuality must be respected; children must be understood in context; children’s families are vitally important; children still need lawyers to serve as lawyers; children’s lawyers need to expand their horizons; and children’s lawyers must pursue justice for children.” A minority position within the Las Vegas Conference disagreed with limiting child representation to the client-directed model, particularly with very young children.

The Uniform Act
In July 2006, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved the Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act (the Act) to implement the ABA Standards. However, NCCUSL was not bound by the Standards, and there are some provisions which do not follow either of them. Further, the Act is narrower in scope because as legislation, it cannot promulgate practice standards. The Act identifies three roles for child representatives: the child’s attorney (the traditional client-directed role), the best interests attorney (a child’s attorney who is not bound by the client’s directives or objectives), and the court-appointed advisor (a new term to define “an individual, not functioning as an attorney, appointed to assist the court in determining the best interests of a child.”)

The Act adopts the ABA client-directed position for attorneys in the role of child’s attorney. The Act includes factors the court should consider in determining which type of representative to appoint. The Act does make clear, in conformity with both ABA Standards, the AAML Standards, the Fordham Recommendations, and the UNLV Recommendations, that attorneys should not be witnesses or quasi-witnesses (submitting reports or making recommendations other than by means of legal argument based on the evidence), which is a role now assigned to a court-appointed attorney. Further, in keeping with the modern trend, the Act rejects the hybrid role of attorney/guardian ad litem. The Act has been criticized for embracing the role of best interests attorney instead of requiring a client-directed model in all cases.

The Humble Model for the Future
The client-directed model of child representation (even as modified for children with diminished capacity to direct representation), which is the majority position expressed by the various standards and recommendations, sees the child as having at least some capacity to understand the legal process and formulate the objectives of representation, albeit with the counseling assistance of the attorney. This recognition of capacity presupposes that the client can know what he or she wants to do within the context of the litigation. Even a substituted judgment model of representation seeks to understand the child’s situation through the child’s eyes and to determine how decisions will impact the child’s experience of his or her life.

The AAML Standards and both sets of ABA Standards require attorneys to establish and maintain a relationship with their child clients, whether or not they are able to direct representation, and to conduct an independent investigation. Regardless of the model adopted, the NACC recommends that the attorney must engage in regular and meaningful communication with the child. The Fordham Recommendations and UNLV Recommendations require the attorney to get to know the “child-in-context” to a degree which goes far beyond traditional practice in representing children. The Act requires the attorney acting in either

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defined role to meet with the child, maintain a relationship with the child, and conduct an independent investigation. Professor Jean Koh Peters states it most succinctly: the child’s attorney must understand “how this client speaks, how this client sees the world, what this client values, and what shows this client respect.” All of this focus on getting to know the child client and his or her context reflects the recognition that the child has important information to provide. I have argued elsewhere that we need to begin to view children and their families as experts on themselves.

The concern for the ramifications of legal positions taken applies to private custody cases as well as to child welfare cases. Children at the center of the dispute are often the only ones whose voices and concerns are not heard. If they are heard at all, it may be only through the filter of someone else’s interpretations: the social worker, custody evaluator, court investigator, or even their own attorney or guardian ad litem.

Judges and others often express concern that children not be “put in the middle” of a dispute or that they lack the maturity to make decisions in their cases, among the most frequently feared consequences of giving children attorneys who function primarily in a traditional role. But children are in the middle of custody and child welfare cases, and it is a fiction to act as if they are not or to act as if denying them representation will shield them from the dispute and its ramifications. Jealous advocacy for the child’s positions simply puts the child’s perspective before the court to be considered along with the other parties’ perspectives. No decision by a judge, any more than any conclusion by a scientist, can be better than the data upon which it is based, and adding the child’s own perspective can only help to inform a better decision-making process. It is a gross overstatement to translate giving children client-directed attorneys into the proposition that children are deciding their cases or are responsible for the decision made, any more than a parent decides a case by taking a zealously advocated position. The fact that some judges routinely rubber stamp what the child’s attorney or guardian ad litem advocates is most appropriately remedied by greater training for judges, not by depriving the child of a real voice at the table and real advocacy.

Attorneys have the training to investigate, organize, and analyze the facts of their cases; to counsel their clients on alternatives; to think creatively about solutions; and to advocate positions on behalf of their clients. All of the recommendations and models discussed in this article require specialized training for attorneys who undertake to represent child clients, regardless of the role assigned to the attorney. That training is necessary to equip the attorney for the special demands of dealing with a child client. But even with that training, attorneys do not have the expertise to know what is best for a given child in a given circumstance. They do not have the time to get to know the child, family, social structure, and resources well enough to be confident that a position taken will obtain the best result for the child. They will not be involved with the child over a long enough time and with sufficient frequency and intimacy to monitor the actual long-term outcome of the positions taken or the decisions made by the court. The reality is that attorneys come into a child’s life at a moment in time and then move on. The ripples of that involvement, and the involvement of the legal system itself, will continue to affect the child and his or her family for years, perhaps for the rest of their lives. Physicians still honor Hippocrates’ admonition: first, do no harm. Attorneys for children would do well to do the same.

Because attorneys for children do not know what is best for children, the child client deserves the respect of having an attorney who will consider his or her positions and the reasons for those positions, who will provide independent counsel to the child to inform those positions, who will attempt to settle the disputes with the other parties, and failing that, who will be an honest broker of the child’s positions to the court, and who will marshal the evidence and legal arguments which support those positions.

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Endnotes

7. See, generally, AAML, Standards, supra note 3.
8. See id. at Standards 2.2, 2.3.
9. Id. at Standard 2.7, comment.
10. Id. at Standards 2.7, 2.12, 2.13.
12. See ABA Abuse and Neglect Standards, supra note 3, at B-3, comment (stating, “[t]here are factors other than age which may affect the child’s ability to participate in a determination of his or her position is functional, depending upon the particular position and the circumstances prevailing at the time the position must be determined. Therefore, a child may be able to determine some positions in the case but not others. Similarly, a child may be able to direct the lawyer with respect to a particular issue at one time but not at another. This standard relies on empirical knowledge about competencies with respect to both adults and children.”); ABA Custody Standards, supra note 3, Standard IV(C)-1, comment (stating, “[t]hese Standards do not presume that children of a certain age are ‘impaired,’ ‘disabled,’ ‘incompetent,’ or lack capacity to determine their position in litigation. Disability is contextual, incremental, and may be intermittent. The child’s ability to contribute to a determination of his or her position is functional, depending upon the particular position and the circumstances prevailing at the time the position must be determined. Therefore, a child may be able to determine some positions in the case but not others. Similarly, a child may be able to direct the lawyer with respect to a particular issue at one time but not at another.”)
13. See Fordham Recommendations, supra note 4, at 1309-1311. (Recommendation IV(B)(2) sets forth a detailed methodology for determining the child’s legal interests in an objective manner and recommends presenting multiple options to the court if there is no definitively preferable option for the child). UNLV Recommendations, supra note 4, at 609. (Recommendations in Part IV “expressly reject the notion that there should be a bright line rule based on age or any other generic factor de-marking when a child’s lawyer should treat the child as a traditional client or as an incapacitated client.”)
14. See ABA Abuse and Neglect Standards, supra note 3, at Standards B-4, B-5, comments.
15. Id. at Standard B-2, comment.
18. See ABA Custody Standards, supra note 3, at Standard II(B)(1).
19. Id. at Standard II(B)(1).
20. Id. at Standard II(B).
21. Id. at Standard V(F), comment.
22. Id. at Standard III(E), comment; see also ABA Custody Standards, supra note 3, at Standard IV(B) (requiring the child’s attorney to meet with the child “upon appointment, before court hearings, when apprised of emergencies or significant events affecting the child, and at other times as needed”); id. at Standard V (indicating that for the best interests attorney “[m]eetings with the children and all parties are among the most important elements of a competent investigation.”)
23. See Fordham Recommendations, supra note 4, at 1303.
24. Id., at 1410-1416. Recommendation I-A(4)(b)(xii) requires the lawyer, when developmentally appropriate, to “collaborate on the identification and selection of case strategies.” Id. Recommendation IV-B(3)(b) requires the lawyer for the preverbal or impaired child to achieve a detailed understanding of the child, including “the client’s own words, stories, and desires at every possible point.” Id. Recommendation V-A(1) states that as with adults, “lawyers have an ethical obligation to advocate the position of the child unless there is independent evidence that the child is unable to express a reasoned choice.” Id.
25. Id. at 1408-1409 (providing that a lawyer for a child “should not serve as the child’s guardian ad litem or in another role insofar as the role includes responsibilities inconsistent with those of a lawyer for the child”). Fordham Recommendation I-A recommends changes in
laws authorizing appointment of a lawyer as guardian ad litem to authorize instead appointment of a lawyer to represent the child and recommends elimination of laws requiring children's lawyers to assume responsibilities inconsistent with those of a lawyer for the child as the client. Id. 26. Susan L. Brooks, Representing Children in Families, 6 Nev. L.J. 724 (Spring 2006).

27. See UNLV Recommendations, supra note 4, at 592.

28. UNLV Recommendation IV.A.1 states: Statement of Principle: Children's attorneys should take their direction from the client and should not substitute for the child's wishes the attorney's own judgment of what is best for children or for that child. Children's attorneys have the responsibility to create the conditions for and promote child-directed representation. Besides enhancing the child's ability to direct representation, such conditions can also help teach the child to advocate for him- or herself when the attorney is not present. When children have diminished capacity or are without capacity to direct representation, attorneys should conduct representation in principled ways. When the client lacks capacity to decide, the attorney may be required to interpose other viewpoints or even to substitute her judgment for that of the client. This important step involves gathering information from a wide range of sources as well as familiarizing oneself with the child's family, community and culture in order to arrive at or to advocate for a decision the child would make if she or he were capable. Id. at Recommendation IV.A.


30. Id. at 683.

31. Id.

32. Bruce A. Green & Annette R. Appell, Representing Children in Families—Foreword, 6 Nev. L.J. 571, 578 (Spring 2006).

33. See Donald N. Duquette, Two Distinct Roles/Bright Line Test, 6 Nev. L.J. 1240 (Spring 2006); Robert F. Harris, A Response to the Recommendations of the UNLV Conference: Another Look at the Attorney/Guardian ad Litem Model, 6 Nev. L.J. 1284 (Spring 2006).

34. See NCCUSL Act, supra note 5.

35. Id. at §§ 2(2)–(4).

36. Id. at § 12.

37. Id. at § 4(b) (regarding abuse and neglect cases, "[i]n determining whether to appoint a child's attorney or a best interests attorney, the court may consider such factors as the child's age and developmental level, any desire for an attorney expressed by the child, whether the child has expressed objectives in the proceeding, and the value of an independent advocate for the child's best interests."); id. at § 6(c) (regarding custody cases, "in determining whether a child's attorney, best interests attorney, or court appointed advisor is appropriate, the court shall consider such factors as the child's age and developmental level, any desire for an attorney expressed by the child, whether the child has expressed objectives in the proceeding, the value of an independent advocate for the child's best interests, and the value of a court-appointed advisor's expertise.").

38. NCCUSL Act, supra note 5, at § 14. Section 8(b) makes it clear that a court-appointed advisor "may take only those actions that may be taken by a court-appointed advisor who is not an attorney," which should dissuade judges from appointing attorneys in the role of court-appointed advisor with the expectation that the attorney will function in a hybrid role. Id. at § 8(b).

39. Id. at §§ 2, 9.


41. Attorneys are expected to counsel all clients, including adults: By developing a relationship with the child client, and by understanding what is important to the child, the attorney representing a child plays a particularly important role in developing a decision-making partnership.

42. See Ann M. Haralambie, Recognizing the Expertise of Children and Families, 6 Nev. L.J. 1277, 1280 (Spring 2006).

43. See AAML Standards, supra note 3, at Standards 2.4, 2.8, 2.12, comments; ABA Abuse and Neglect Standards, supra note 3, at Standard C-1; ABA Custody Standards, supra note 3, at Standard II(B)(2). The AAML Standards require the attorney for an unimpared child to represent the client in a traditional role, which would implicitly involve independence in developing evidence. AAML Standards, supra note 3. The AAML Standards are explicit in requiring the attorney for an impaired child to investigate evidence to be presented to the court. Id. at § 2.12.

44. See NACC Recommendations, supra note 3, Recommendation III(B)(2).

45. See Fordham Recommendations, supra note 4, at Recommendation II(A)(3).

46. See UNLV Recommendations, supra note 4, at Recommendation IV.A.

47. NCCUSL Act, supra note 5, at § 11.

48. See JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 258 (1997). Professor Peters was a significant drafter of the Fordham Recommendations created from the working group on determining the best interests of the child at the Fordham Conference.

49. See Haralambie, supra note 42. In the article I argue:

Children have their own world view. They alone know what is of greatest subjective importance to them. They know what relationships matter to them. They know what activities they want to remain involved with. They can often provide valuable information on family interactions and other family resources. If we really listen to them, we may be surprised at the insights they have about what does and does not work in their families. We need to go beyond finding out what they want and explore their reasons for what they want, which may lead the attorney-client partnership in an entirely different direction. Further, we need to consider how alternative proposed placements will feel from the child's perspective. The "cure" may be worse for the child than the family dysfunction from which we seek to extricate the child. If we have nothing better to offer the child, then we have no conscientious basis upon which to intervene. [In this argument clearly applies to out-of-home placements, but it also applies to various services which the agency may offer the family but which may conflict with other important elements of the fabric of the family's life. For example, counseling appointments which cost the breadwinner his or her job and visitation schedules which deprive the child of favorite extracurricular activities may satisfy agency convenience at the expense of what the family needs. "Routine" services which are not offered based on an individualized need for them may discourage family members and lead to non-compliance.] We need to think about proportionality of responses in light of the impact on the entire life of the child and family. We need to find out how these services will affect the family, beyond our assumptions about the intended benefits.

Id. at 1282.

50. See Fordham Recommendations, supra note 4, at 1309, Recommendation IV(B)(2) (stating "[n]othing about legal training or traditional legal roles qualifies lawyers to make decisions on behalf of their clients. References to the lawyer's own childhood, stereotypical views of clients whose backgrounds differ from the lawyers, and the lawyer's lay understanding of child development and children's needs should be considered highly suspect bases for decision making on behalf of her client.").

51. I do not assume that judges themselves trained as attorneys know any better than attorneys what is best for a child. But judges' role requires them to make decisions, for better or worse, based on application of the law to the facts presented to them through the evidence. The function of an attorney is not to act as a judge before the case is presented to the judge. The function of the attorney is to represent the client.